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NOTES
EVALUATING THE NEW DIRECTOR
EXCULPATION STATUTES
In 1985 Delaware enacted a statute' enabling corporations to
adopt a novel species of charter provision: one that eliminates or
limits a director's liability for breach of his fiduciary duty of care.2
Since then, a large number of states have followed Delaware's exam-
ple.3 The statutes epitomize the tendency of corporation law to-
ward what Professor Cary has labelled a "race for the bottom, with
Delaware in the lead." 4 The "race" consists of states' competing
efforts to generate revenue by enticing corporations' management
to incorporate under their laws. As a principal means of entice-
ment, states create a legal environment hospitable to management's
interests. 5 The new statutes enhance their states' pro-management
legal environment to a substantial degree, and in an unusually direct
manner.
Cary pejoratively labels this race one "for the bottom" because,
he believes, the resultant pro-management laws exploit sharehold-
ers. If Cary is correct, then the new statutes will cause more such
exploitation than most race entries, for in permitting exculpation
from the fiduciary duty of care, they permit removal of one of the
two basic devices6 expressly designed to protect shareholders from
1 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986); see infra note 64 and accompany-
ing text.
2 The fiduciary duty of care "demands that top officers and members of the board
of directors invest a certain amount of time and effort and exercise a certain level of skill
and judgment in the operation of the firm." Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law
Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REv. 927, 927 (1983). Just how much
care the duty demands is considered infra notes 23-54 and accompanying text.
The fiduciary duty of care is to be distinguished from the fiduciary duty of loyalty,
which "requires that officers and directors put the interests of the stockholders ahead of
their personal gain and subjects them to oversight in transactions involving conflicts of
interest." Id. at 927-28. The distinction is not always sharp, however, in either theory or
practice. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
3 Most of these states have copied Delaware's statute virtually word for word. See
infra note 65. For that reason this Note will focus on the Delaware version.
4 Gary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663, 705
(1974).
5 Id. at 705; Winter, The Development of the Law of Corporate Governance, 9 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 524, 527 (1984) ("Historically, states have competed to attract corporate char-
ters for revenue purposes and this competition has been the single greatest influence on
the development of the law of corporate governance.").
6 The statute explicitly leaves in place the other device, the fiduciary duty of loy-
alty. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
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management.7
But many recent corporation theorists dispute Cary's thesis.
While agreeing that a race exists,8 they instead conclude that the
race's pro-management results serve both shareholder and manage-
ment interests.9 Shareholders do apparently find the new Delaware
statute advantageous: Delaware corporations have rushed to adopt
the newly permitted provision, and many out-of-state corporations
have even re-incorporated in Delaware in order to do the same.10
This Note considers why shareholders would vote to relinquish a
valuable right, and whether it is desirable to permit them to do so.
One's evaluation of the statute's desirability will depend on
one's judgment of how the "costs"" that the statute engenders
compare to the costs of the common-law regime that the statute re-
places.' 2 Once fiduciary protection is discarded, only the workings
of the marketplace will protect shareholders;' 3 the statute's costs,
then, will equal the extent of the pertinent market failures. Econo-
mists will have to undertake the tasks of identifying and measuring
the latter;' 4 this Note addresses the other side of the scale, under-
taking to identify' 5 the imperfections of the common-law regime.
7 See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
221 (1932).
8 See, e.g., Winter, supra note 5, at 527.
9 See, e.g., Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competi-
tion" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980) (change in state of incorporation
correlates with small positive excess returns); Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited:
Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913 (1982);
Winter, supra note 5, at 527-28 ("Mhis competition among states leads to optimal rules
governing the relationship of shareholders to corporations.... I would submit ... that
the race is to the top."). See generally infra notes 70-96 and accompanying text.
10 Powell, Is It Safe to Go Back in the Boardroom?, Newsweek, May 4, 1987, at 45, 46.
11 Analysts regularly translate problems into "costs" to facilitate the comparison of
one problem with another. See A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
10 (1983) (One "standard assumption of economic analysis" is that "all benefits and
costs can be measured in terms of a common denominator-dollars.") The device's
conceptual utility should not, however, obscure its practical limitations; many costs, in-
cluding the sacrifice of freedom of contract examined infra notes 133-88 and accompa-
nying text, defy quantification. See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
The degree of a cost is measured by the severity of a problem reduced by the un-
likelihood of its occurrence. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.1, at 147 (3d
ed. 1986).
12 The latter costs are discussed infra notes 100-88 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 64-96 and accompanying text.
14 See Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9
DEL.J. CORP. L. 540 (1980); see alsoJensen & Ruback, The Marketfor Corporate Controk The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983).
15 Measuring (as opposed to identifying) each of these costs presents a perhaps
insurmountable empirical challenge. For example, to what degree do directors avoid
risk for fear of personal liability? What amount of a corporations' profits are forgone as
a result? See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112
n.10 (1985) ("[IThe concept of corporate managerial efficiency . .. is one for which
there are no objective standards."); see also Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 547 ("We can-
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As a foundation for that undertaking, Part I sets forth the com-
mon law of directors' fiduciary duty of care, with particular refer-
ence to the vagueness and confusion that pervade that doctrine.' 6
Part II sets forth the mechanics of the new statute,' 7 and sketches
the workings of the market mechanisms that it relies upon to pro-
vide the shareholders' only protection against careless directors.' 8
Part III identifies the costs, both practical and ideological, of the
common-law regime, i.e., directors' behavioral inefficiency,19 deter-
rence of individuals from assuming directorial responsibilities, 20
and infringement of shareholders' freedom of contract.2' Part IV
argues that the statute is desirable, because the gains that it effects
by preserving shareholders' freedom of contract will outweigh any
costs that market mechanisms will impose on some shareholders. 22
I
THE COMMON LAW OF DIRECTORS' FIDUCIARY
DUTY OF CARE
Exasperated dictum observes that "[t]he doctrine of the fiduci-
ary relation is one of the most confused and entangled subjects in
corporation law." 23 At the risk of lending more coherence to the
field than it may deserve, the following discussion classifies the con-
fusion on three levels: (1) the content of fiduciary duty; (2) formu-
lating the duty of care into rules; and (3) applying the rules to
individuals' conduct.
A. Content
Courts and others display confusion concerning the content of
fiduciary duty by sometimes muddling the distinction 24 between its
not measure [the size or existence of the purported gap between present and optimal
governance structures] by comparing one firm against another, because each firm is a
unique bundle of assets, prospects, and managers. We also cannot compare the price
of, say, Apple Computer stock under optimal governance structures with its actual
price.").
16 Infra notes 23-54 and accompanying text.
17 Infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
18 Infra notes 70-96 and accompanying text.
19 Infra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
20 Infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
21 Infra notes 121-88 and accompanying text.
22 Infra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
23 Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 629 (D. Del. 1943).
24 See, e.g., R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF MERGERS AND AcQuJsmIONS 146
(Supp. 1987) (noting "frequent failure of courts and commentators in takeover settings
to distinguish between the duty of care and duty of loyalty"); Scott, supra note 2, at 932
n.20 (giving example from ALl Corporate Governance Project of "the tangled thinking
that pervades this subject"); cf Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Deriva-
788 [Vol. 73"-786
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two branches, care and loyalty. 25 The two branches actually have
little in common 26 except that the common law imposes them both
upon caretakers (such as corporate directors) of others' property.
The new Delaware statute affects only the duty of care, expressly
preserving the fiduciary duty of loyalty.27
B. Formulation
Confusion pervades this second level, which concerns formulat-
ing the duty of care into a rule. The only certainty is that one must
at least avoid negligence to escape breaching the duty.28 Beyond
that, the doctrine's uncertainties abound and compound. These un-
certainties can be divided into three groups.
1. The Nature of Simple Negligence
Negligence is a notoriously slippery concept, haunted by "that
factitious ghost, the 'reasonable man.' "29 In attempting to define
live Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 291
(1986) (focusing on boundary case and concluding that no sharp distinction exists).
One group of cases dramatizing the muddling of the care and loyalty branches in-
volves the courts' acceptance of the business judgment rule as a defense to allegations of
breach of the duty of loyalty. Properly understood, the business judgment rule (which
insulates directors from the undesirable consequences of their decisions) applies only to
allegations of breach of the duty of care. Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8
HoFsTRA L. REV. 93, 111, 115-18 (1979). Examples from this group of cases are cited in
Scott, The Role of Preconceptions in Policy Analysis in Law: A Response to Fischel and Bradley, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 299, 306 n.29 (1986). See also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1985) (business judgment rule is founded on
principles of "care, loyalty and independence") (emphasis added); Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (applying business judgment rule to parent's self-
interested decision to cause subsidiary to pay dividend); Arsht, supra, at 94 n.5 (noting
Professor Folk's "[i]nexplicabl[e]" examination of the business judgment rule in con-
nection with Delaware's conflict of interest statute.).
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), discussed infra notes 119-22, was
decided on duty of care grounds, but makes more sense as a duty of loyalty case.
Although the court does not say so explicitly, the clear implication of the
opinion is that Van Gorkom was looking out for Pritzker's interests rather
than Trans Union's. As in most cases finding a violation of the business
judgment rule, there are strong hints of breach of the duty of loyalty.
R. GILSON, supra, at 813.
25 E.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) ("A
board member's obligation to a corporation and its shareholders... [is] generally char-
acterized as the duty of care and the duty of loyalty".); Scott, supra note 2, at 927 (fiduci-
aries owe certain duties which "customarily fall into two broad categories: the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty"); Scott, supra note 24, at 299 (referring to "[t]he centrality
of that distinction"). But see Scott, supra note 2, at 932 ("[t]he distinction is not always
sharp").
26 See supra note 2.
27 See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
28 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 930-31 (5th ed. 1979); 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1029, at 11 (1975).
29 L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 39 (1958).
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negligence, "[tihe utmost that can be done is to devise something in
the nature of a formula"; 30 even this task represents a "very difficult
problem."3 1 Courts usually use one of two formulae: that degree of
care "that men of ordinary prudence exercise in regard to their own
affairs" 3 2 or that "degree of care an ordinarily prudent man would
exercise under similar circumstances." 3 3 Interpretation problems34
pervade each of these formulae, and each will assign liability in sets
of cases that do not exactly overlap. 35 Compounding these
problems is the courts' tendency to declare other, conflicting formu-
lae as well:
Attempting ... to define standards of duty, the courts have said,
on various occasions, that corporate directors must exercise rea-
sonable care and diligence; ordinary care and prudence; reason-
able diligence and their best judgment; reasonable care and
business judgment; reasonable intelligence; business discretion;
ordinary skill, vigilance, judgment, and diligence.36
2. How Simple Negligence Differs From Gross Negligence
There is a "very real difficulty in drawing satisfactory lines of
demarcation" 37 between the two standards. Gross negligence may
not actually be, as one judge claimed, merely simple negligence
"with the addition of a vituperative epithet," 38 but the term does
have "no generally accepted meaning." 39 In one sense, it describes
30 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 173
(1984) [hereinafter W. KEETON].
31 Id. at 174.
32 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 28, § 1037, at 32-33.
33 Id. § 1038; H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAWs OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER Busi-
NESS ENTERPRISES 622 (3d ed. 1970).
34 Just how prudent is the "ordinarily" prudent man? What are "his own affairs,"
and what would he do in them? What "circumstances" does the rule refer to and how
"similar" must they be?
35 The own-affairs standard "is capable of adapting to changing times and changing
notions of investment opportunity and risk taking, whereas the [similar-circumstances
standard] is static. It imports conventional limitations for the preservation of capital and
the avoidance of risk taking ...." Fleming, Prudent Investments: The Varying Standards of
Prudence, 12 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 243, 246 (1977).
36 H. SPELLMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING CORPORATE
DIRECTORS 532-33 (1931) (footnotes omitted).
37 W. KEETON, supra note 30, § 34, at 211.
38 Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, 116, 152 Eng. Rep. 737, 739 (1843). Compare
Arthur Prentice Rugg's explanation of the difference between negligence, gross negli-
gence and recklessness "as the difference between a fool, a damned fool and a god-
damned fool." Bernard, How to Get Through to Laymen, 55 A.B.A.J. 45, 45 n.2 (1969).
39 W. KEETON, supra note 30, at 212; see also Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co.,
35 L.R.C.P. 321, 324-25 (C.P. 1866), quoted in Arsht, supra note 24, at 120-21 n.l 19 ("I
advisedly abstained from using a word to which I can attach no definite meaning and no-
one, as far as I know, ever was able to do so"). Prosser and Keeton write:
Although the idea of "degrees of negligence" has not been without its
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an actor's conduct: departure from due care that is extreme.40 In
another sense, it describes an actor's state of mind: recognition and
disregard of a risk being taken.4 1 The term has been used in both
senses on the same page of a single state supreme court opinion.42
3. Determining Which of the Two Standards Applies
Delaware left this matter unresolved until as astonishingly late
as 1984, when its supreme court decided that management need
only avoid gross negligence.43 Given corporate directors' need to
plan their actions precisely, Delaware's long indecision on such an
advocates, it has been condemned by most writers, and, except in bail-
ment cases, rejected at common law by most courts, as a distinction
"vague and impracticable in [its] nature, so unfounded in principle," that
it adds only difficulty and confusion to the already nebulous and uncer-
tain standards which must be given to the jury.
W. KEETON, supra note 30, § 34, at 210 (footnotes omitted).
40 E.g., Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 54 N.Y.2d 167, 172, 445
N.Y.S.2d 60, 62, 429 N.E.2d 739, 740 (1981) ("failure to exercise even slight care").
Conduct that a court might hold grossly negligent within this sense includes:
(1) approving a sale of assets based only upon information provided in the course of a
cursory oral presentation, see Tomezak & Wechsler v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. 7861,
slip op. (Del. Ch. May 7, 1986); cf Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)
(discussed infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text); and (2) failing to learn of acquir-
ing corporation's year-long commitment to purchase shares at a more favorable price
than accepted, see Rabkin v. Hunt Chem. Corp., No. 7547, slip op. (Del. Ch. Dec. 4,
1986).
41 In this sense, gross negligence is equivalent to "recklessness," which is defined
as "[t]he state of mind accompanying an act, which either pays no regard to its probably
or possibly injurious consequences, or which, though foreseeing such consequences,
persists in spite of such knowledge." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1142 (5th ed. 1979); see,
e.g., Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or. 366, 391-92, 354 P.2d 56, 68 (1960) ("gross negli-
gence" as used in statute "means reckless conduct").
42 Redington v. Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co., 107 Cal. 317, 324, 40 P. 432, 434
(1895).
43 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
Prior to Aronson, Delaware's duty of care standard had been particularly murky. In
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963), for example, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court formulated a standard of care rule that rang only of simple negli-
gence ("that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in
similar circumstances"), but then glossed that rule in gross negligence terms:
If he has recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy em-
ployee, has refused or neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a direc-
tor, or has ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious danger
signs of employee wrongdoing, the law will cast the burden of liability
upon him.
Id. at 130 (emphasis added). This language "muddies the waters." Veasey & Manning,
Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or Unchartered Reef?. An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of
Care Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAw. 919, 928 (1980).
Other Delaware cases also employed diverse and imprecise articulations of the stan-
dard of care. E.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) ("fraud or
gross overreaching"); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970)
("gross and palpable overreaching"); Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261
(Del. Ch. 1929) ("reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the stockhold-
ers"). See generally Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 n.6.
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important question is an unfortunate commentary on the common
law of the fiduciary duty of care in that state.
Even Delaware's recent decision, welcome though it is, is of lit-
tle help to planners, given the unclarity of the terrain that gross neg-
ligence occupies. 44 "Although it is now clear that the Delaware duty
of care standard is not ordinary negligence but gross negligence, it
is not clear precisely what that standard means." 45
C. Application
Confusion is both most rampant and least desireable 46 at the
stage of applying the duty-of-care rules to individuals' conduct.
One reason for this lies in the cumulative nature of the two kinds of
confusion examined above; the uncertainty of standards47 yields un-
certainty of results. "In truth, one cannot say whether a man has
been guilty of negligence, gross or otherwise, unless one can deter-
mine what is the extent of the duty which he is alleged to have
neglected." 48
The other reason lies in the fact-bound, case-by-case manner in
which courts make duty-of-care judgments. The United States
Supreme Court has declared that "the question of negligence is ...
ultimately a question of fact, to be determined under all the circum-
stances."' 49 And William Meade Fletcher observes that duty-of-care
rules, however formulated, are of little practical use in. answering
this question of fact:
In determining whether directors are liable for negligent misman-
44 See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
45 1 R. BALOTTI &J. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND Busi-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.7, at 96 (1986). On the unclear meaning of duty of care stan-
dards, see generally supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
Nor have Delaware decisions been helpful in giving content to the newly-announced
standard. Bayless Manning observes that there is still "virtually no law" on the "basic
question[]" of "[how apparently 'aberrational,"' or grossly negligent, a directorial de-
cision may be before triggering liability. Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in
the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 3 (1985).
Even the landmark Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), the only re-
ported Delaware decision explicitly holding directors liable for gross negligence, offers
little concrete guidance. "The opinion is a recital of explicit and implicit do's and
don'ts," from which is absent, however, any reliable rule concerning what actions are
required or prohibited in a given context. Manning, supra, at 3, 8-14. See generally infra
notes 119-22 and accommpanying text.
46 Reasons for the undesirability are given infra notes 101-88 and accompanying
text.
4'7 See W. KEETON, supra note 30, § 34, at 210 ("nebulous and uncertain standards
which must be given to the jury").
48 In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates, Ltd. [1911], 1 Ch. 425, 436, quoted in
3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 28, § 1034, at 30 (1986).
49 Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 512 (1919); Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S.
132, 152 (1891).
792 [Vol. 73:786
DIRECTOR EXCULPATION STATUTES
agement, the courts have been prone to use fine-sounding phrases
in defining the duties of directors, and then proceed to decide the
case without reference thereto-the rules laid down being such
glittering generalities that the case could be decided either way
thereunder without violating the rules.50
The difficulty lies in determining the meaning of words. The
courts determine the meaning of "duty of care" by rule;5 1 but at no
point do courts ever determine the meaning of that rule, except on
the unpredictable, case-by-case basis that Fletcher describes. 52 This
is because "[c]ourts do not hear evidence as to what an 'ordinary
prudent man' would do, either in the conduct of his own affairs or in
the particular circumstances of the case. Nor do they often compare
the facts of cases . . -53 Thus, each trier of fact determines
whether a defendant has breached his duty of care by comparing the
defendant's conduct not with any truly objective measure, but rather
only with his own individual notions of what constitutes "ordinary,"
"prudent," et cetera. "'[O]ur "excellent, but odious" friend-the
ordinarily prudent person-never takes the stand to enlighten
judges or juries .... "54
One may wonder why the business community should find fault
with the common-law system's unpredictability55 when the same un-
predictable, case-by-case process applies to duty-of-care adjudica-
tion in nonbusiness contexts as well,5 6 and theorists voice no
objection to the process there.57 One explanation lies in the busi-
50 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 32, § 1029, at 12.
51 See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
52 In effect, the content of the rules changes to accommodate each verdict. "mhis
standard of the reasonable man.., enables the triers of fact ... to express their judg-
ment of what that standard is .. " RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 283 comment c
(1965).
See also W. KEETON, supra note 30, § 32, at 173 ("[T]he infinite variety of situations
which may arise makes it impossible to fix definite rules [or afortiori the content thereof]
in advance for all conceivable human conduct.").
The factfinder's latitude creates difficulties for business planners. See infra notes
101-22 and accompanying text.
53 Nielsen, Directors'Duties under Anglo-American Corporation Law, 43 U. DET. L.J. 605,
612 (1966).
54 Veasey & Manning, supra note 43, at 931 (quoting A. HERBERT, MISLEADING
CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 12 (7th ed. 1932)).
55 See infra notes 101-32 and accompanying text.
56 The application of this standard of reasonable conduct is as wide as all
human behavior. There is scarcely any act which, under some conceiva-
ble circumstances, may not involve an unreasonable risk of harm. Even
going to sleep becomes negligence when it is done on a railway track, or
at the wheel of an automobile.
W. KEETON, supra note 30, § 33, at 193.
57 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328C comment b (noting uncriti-
cally that injury questions "the same conclusion will not necessarily be reached in two
identical cases"); W. KEETON, supra note 30, § 37, at 237 (determining negligence is for
1988] 793
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ness community's greater felt need to evaluate the degree of risk it
engages in; Professors Veasey and Manning point out that
to equate the analyses in common negligence cases with those in-
volving corporate decision-making overlooks the different values
society assigns to the behavior under review. There seems to be
no discernable bias, in common negligence cases, to encourage
our perambulating friend to risk crossing the street. On the other
hand, courts have traditionally favored freedom in corporate deci-
sion-making in response to society's encouragement of risk-taking
enterprises .58
Another explanation lies in the business community's unique access
to certain market mechanisms, detailed below,59 which arguably
protect shareholders better than does the common-law regime.
II
THE DELAWARE STATUTE'S MECHANICS AND THE
REMAINING MARKET MECHANISMS OF
SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
A. The Statute's Mechanics
Delaware apparently enacted 60 its new statute to counter only
one of the three costs6 1 associated with the common-law regime:
deterrence of individuals from assuming directorial responsibili-
ties.62 Delaware chose to alleviate this cost by permitting each cor-
poration to set its own ceiling on the amount shareholders could
recover in a duty-of-care lawsuit, instead of imposing a uniform ceil-
the jury "because the public insists that its conduct be judged in part by the man in the
street rather than by lawyers, and the jury serves as a shock-absorber to cushion the
impact of the law").
58 Veasey & Manning, supra note 43, at 931-32.
59 Infra notes 70-96 and accompanying text.
60 No formal legislative history material for the statute exists. The Corporation
Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association wrote the statute, and the legislature
adopted it as written. Black & Sparks, Analysis of the 1986 Amendments to the Delaware Cor-
poration Law, 3 Corp. (P-H) 311 (1986).
61 See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
62 The [1986] amendments [to Delaware's General Corporation Law] were
prompted by a growing awareness by members of the Corporation Law
Section of the Delaware Bar Association that directors' concerns about
personal liability were causing Delaware corporations to lose, or to be
unable to attract, qualified men and women to serve on their boards.
These concerns were heightened by highly publicized lawsuits involving
potentially ruinous recoveries against individual directors and were
brought to a head by dislocations in the market for directors and officers
liability insurance, which saw some corporations' insurance cancelled and
almost all corporations experiencing dramatic increases in the cost of in-
surance coupled with cutbacks in the scope of coverage.
Black & Sparks, supra note 60, at 311. For an examination of the nature and the origin of
this deterrent cost, see infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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ing on that amount. Those corporations that eliminate directors'
duty-of-care liability altogether are, in effect, setting zero as their
ceiling.63
The statute accomplishes this by adding an item to the list of
provisions that a corporation's charter may contain. The statute
permits
[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a di-
rector to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary dam-
ages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such
provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director:
(i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corpora-
tion or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith
or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
law; (iii) under § 174 of this Title [concerning willful or negligent
stock repurchases and dividend payments]; or (iv) for any transac-
tion from which the director derived an improper personal
benefit .... 64
The statute thus works no self-implementing change in a director's
common-law duty; it merely enables a corporation to effect the
change, if its stockholders so choose.6 5
Even when stockholders do adopt the specified charter provi-
sion, the duty of care itself remains in place; only a director's mone-
tary liability for its breach is removed. Accordingly, shareholders
retain equitable remedies such as recission and injunction. 66 The
duty and its breach could also continue to bear on nonlitigation is-
sues, such as the re-election or removal of directors.
6 7
Further limiting the statute's impact are its four exclusions.
Stockholders adopting the newly permitted charter provision waive
their rights only against directors who, albeit careless, do act with
63 Idj
64 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
65 At least ten states have substantially identical statutes. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-054(A)(9) (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(2) (Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 491.5(8) (West Supp. 1988); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 156B, § 13 (Supp. 1988); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8364 (Purdon Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-58.8 (Supp.
1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102 (Supp. 1987); TEX. REV. CirV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-
7.06 (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 23A.12.020 (Supp. 1987).
Oklahoma's statute is similar but self-implementing; it abolishes the duty of care
except for those corporations that opt back into the common-law regime. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1006(B)(6) (West Supp. 1987).
In addition, several states have adopted modified duty statutes, setting forth direc-
torial standards of care that differ from the common law. See Newcomb, The Limitation of
Directors' Liability: A Proposal for Statutoy Reform, 66 TEx. L. REV. 411, 443-46 (1987).
66 Del. Legis. Council's Synopsis, 65 Del. Laws ch. 289; CORP. COUNS. WEEKLY, July
8, 1986, at 2. On the availability of equitable remedies in derivative suits, see generally
13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 32, §§ 6027-6043.
67 CORP. COUNS. WEEKLY, July 8, 1986, at 2.
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loyalty and in good faith, and who derive no improper personal
benefit.68
Even at first blush, then, the statute permits little of the share-
holder exploitation that Professor Cary fears;69 at worst, sharehold-
ers will suffer the costs created by well-meaning directors who
inadvertently act carelessly. Moreover, as argued immediately be-
low, rational shareholders will remain largely protected from even
that limited degree of harm.
B. Remaining Market Mechanisms of Shareholder Protection
Corporations, like trusts, are characterized by a "separation of
ownership from control"; 70 shareholders, like trust beneficiaries,
cannot directly manage their property. 71 To prevent harm at the
hands of a careless (or malicious 72) director, they need, therefore, a
form of indirect control. Corporation law, like trust law, has tradi-
68 The statute is silent on whether it would shelter a director who is "reckless." See
supra note 41. Presumably, reckless behavior would remain actionable under the stat-
ute's bad faith or duty of loyalty exceptions.
Indiana's director exculpation statute, which does not distinguish between the du-
ties of care and loyalty, explicitly excludes protection for reckless conduct. IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (Bums Supp. 1987).
69 See supra text accompanying note 4.
70 E.g., Fischel, supra note 9, at 916. This phrase is the usual label attached to the
idea first put forth in A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 7:
The position of the owner has been reduced to that of having a set of
legal and factual interests in the enterprise while [hired managers] are in
the position of having legal and factual powers over it.
Id. at 113. Professors Demsetz and Lehn observe that
Berle and Means's work was anticipated by Thorstein Veblen's (1924)
volume, The Engineers and the Price System. Veblen believed that he was
witnessing the transfer of control from capitalistic owners to engineer-
managers and that the consequences of this transfer were to become
more pronounced as diffusely owned corporations grew in economic im-
portance. In the wake of this transfer of power, Veblen saw the end of
the type of profit seeking he associated with capitalists, for he believed
that capitalistic owners sought neither efficiency nor increased output so
much as monopolistic restrictions to raise prices. The engineers, trained
and acculturated to seek technological efficiency, would see to it that the
production from the firms they now controlled would rise to higher and
socially more desirable levels. The profits of monopoly would be sacri-
ficed on the altar of efficiency.
Demsetz & Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL.
ECON. 1155, 1173 (1985). Their data tend to refute the Veblen/Berle and Means fore-
cast of shareholder detriment. Id. See generally infra note 82 and accompanying text.
71 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of
a board of directors .... "); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.01(b) (1985) ("All
corporate powers Shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and
affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors .... ").
72 Because the new statute preserves common-law liability for breach of the duty of
loyalty, see supra text accompanying note 64, director malfeasance other than careless-
ness need not be considered here.
796
1988] DIRECTOR EXCULPATION STATUTES 797
tionally supplied that indirect control by imposing fiduciary duties.7 3
Recent theorists have questioned whether shareholders actually
need the fiduciary duty of care after all, in light of certain market
mechanisms that themselves protect shareholders to some extent.74
"[A]re these the rules that stockholders really want and value, or are
they arbitrary and wasteful judicial artifacts?"7 5 Some conclude that
abolishing the duty would not significantly harm its purported bene-
ficiaries, the shareholders. "[Very little of any value would be lost
by outright abolition of the legal duty of care and its accompanying
threat of a lawsuit. Other incentives for an appropriate degree of
care in corporate decisionmaking would ... exist outside the court-
room to correct shortcomings. ' 76 A sketch of the major "other in-
centives" referred to follows.
The first incentive is the market for capital. Rational77 investors
73 Scott, supra note 2, at 927.
74 These protective mechanisms do not apply to close corporations because the
mechanisms' efficacy depends on the existence of a ready market in the firm's stock.
This limitation is not severe, however, because Berle and Means's "separation of owner-
ship and control" is at worst a minor attribute of close corporations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(1) (limiting close corporations to 3Q or fewer shareholders); L. SOL-
OMON, R. STEVENSON, JR. & D. SHWARTZ, CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 302 (1982)
[hereinafter L. SOLOMON] ("shareholders of a close corporation are likely to think [of]
themselves more as partners").
75 Goetz, A Verdict on Corporate Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit: Not Proven, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 344, 345 (1986); see also Scott, supra note 2, at 935 ("How critical is the
legal duty of care to the monitoring of management's performance?").
76 Scott, supra note 2, at 937; see Fischel & Bradley, supra note 24, at 292:
Many analyses of corporate law assume that liability rules enforced
by derivative suits play a fundamental role in aligning the interests of
managers and investors. We have shown that this widespread assump-
tion is not supported by either the theory of liability rules, the available
empirical evidence, or the structure of corporate law.
See also Demsetz, A Commentary on Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 352, 356 (1986)("workable substitute" for duty of care derivative
suits); Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALl Corporate Governance Project, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13-17 (1984) (endorsing Professor Scott's conclusions); Edited Tran-
script of Proceedings of the Business Roundtable/Emory University Law and Economics Center Con-
ference on Remedies Under the ALI Proposals: Law and Economics, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 357,
368 (1986) [hereinafter Edited Transcript] (remarks of Professor Schwartz) (elimination of
duty of care suits would not be "a great tragedy").
77 That people behave rationally, i.e., in their own best interest, is a "basic eco-
nomic assumption." R. POSNER, supra note 11, § 1.3, at 15. It is also a philosophical
premise. See, e.g., F. HAYEE, THE CoNsTrrTON OF LIBERTY 76 (1960) (allowing man
freedom and responsibility "presupposes the capacity on men's part of rational action
.... It presupposes a certain minimum capacity in them for learning and foresight, for
being guided by a knowledge of the consequences of their action").
The presumption of rationality provides a strong foundation for an ideology of au-
tonomy: if individuals recognize and pursue that which is in their own interest, then
government need not and should not intervene. Proponents of a more paternalistic
ideology accordingly dispute the presumption of rationality. E.g., Alexander, Freedom,
Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 1988) ("People do
behave irrationally."). See generally infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
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will only entrust their funds to firms in whose management they
have confidence., Firms that are known to have careless directors
will not attract investors, or will only attract them at a discounted
price. The same applies to firms that have inadequate mechanisms
for monitoring and making public the quality of their directors'
ongoing performance.
Therefore, in order to attract capital,
[m]anagers must select governance structures that ameliorate
shareholders' rational concerns. Both managers and. investors
gain from effective governance. Managers do not want a structure
that grants them "too much" autonomy, because investors who
fear excessive corruption and ineptitude will bid down the price of
shares. 78
In order to secure their own financial well-being, then, firms them-
selves will exact adequate care of their directors.7 9
The second incentive is the market for the firm's product. Like
the firm's investors, its directors want the firm's products to sell well
and to generate profits, because the size of the firm's profits governs
to some extent the size of its directors' compensation.
After they have raised capital, the managers depend on the
firms' profits for their salary and perquisites. Even if the manag-
ers' inside position gives them great ability to take advantage of
the investors, they still find it advantageous to run the firms so as
generally to maximize profits. Then there is a larger kitty into
which they can dip. This may show up in the value of stock hold-
ings and bonuses; in the longer run it controls salary as well.8 0
Indeed poor performance may not only stunt the careless director's
compensation; it may cost him his job.8 Compensating directors
with shares of the firm's stock heightens this incentive.8 2
78 Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28J. L. &
ECON. 179, 180; see infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text (discussing importance of
bidding down price of shares).
79 See generally Easterbrook, supra note 14, and works cited id. at 543-44 n.4.
80 Id. at 554.
81 The careless director's job loss would result from a takeover of the firm by those
who, in their own view and in that of shareholders, can run the firm more efficiently. See
infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
82 Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 554-55; Demsetz, supra note 76, at 356 ("The
structure of ownership in the modern corporation is itselfa source of pressure for keep-
ing management tied to sharehold interests.").
See also Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 70, which finds "no significant [empirical]
relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profit rate, and especially
no significant positive relationship. The data simply lend no support to the Berle-Means
thesis [that management ownership of shares leads to exploitation of other sharehold-
ers]." Id. at 1175-76.
Demsetz also concludes "that shareholders have and use alternatives to the deriva-
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The third incentive is the market for corporate control.83 Out-
siders who perceive8 4 a firm as being managed inefficiently will seek
to acquire control of it, by means of merger,8 5 proxy contest,8 6 or
tender offer.8 7 Shareholders often respond favorably to one of
these takeover devices if they believe that the outsiders can in fact
do a betterjob.88 "Those who are best at running firms will enlarge
the span of their control; those who falter will be replaced."8 9
The fourth incentive is the market for the firm's stock. Profes-
sional investors and investment advisors continuously monitor the
performance of a firm and its directors. If the results of their moni-
toring reveal that the directors' conduct falls below the satisfactory
degree of care, 90 they will sell their (or their clients') stock, causing
the stock's price to fall.91 That fall in stock price causes a series of
responses which, as shown immediately below, brings into play all
three of the market incentives examined thus far.92
To begin with, "the lower price makes it harder for the firm to
raise new capital in competition against other firms with more dedi-
tive suit." Demsetz, supra note 76, at 356. The alternatives to which Demsetz refers
presumably include the market mechanisms sketched in this Part.
83 This concept was introduced in Manne, supra note 15, at 110; see also Easter-
brook, supra note 14, at 564-70; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Man-
agement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1169-74 (1981); Fischel,
Efficent Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Contro and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1978); Fischel, supra note 9, at 919; Jensen & Ruback,
supra note 14; Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6J.
LEG. STUDIES 251, 262-73 (1977).
84 This perception may arise from the stock market as well as from competitors'
subjective evaluations.
Share price, or that part reflecting managerial efficiency... measures the
potential capital gain inherent in the corporate stock. The lower the
stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient management,
the more attractive the take-over becomes to those who believe that they
can manage the company more efficiently.
Manne, supra note 15, at 113. On the effects of the stock market generally, see infra
notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
85 Manne, supra note 15, at 117-19.
86 Id. at 114-15.
87 Id. at 115-17.
88 Jensen & Ruback, supra note 14.
89 Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 564.
90 Because the monitors are professionals, one can expect their evaluations of di-
rectorial care to be relatively accurate with respect to the "optimality" discussed infra
notes 98 & 110, especially in comparison to the uninformed evaluations made by juries.
See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
91 See Manne, supra note 83, at 112:
As an existing company is poorly managed-in the sense of not making as
great a return for the shareholders as could be accomplished under other
feasible managements-the market price of the shares declines relative to
the shares of other companies in the same industry or relative to the mar-
ket as a whole.
92 See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
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cated managers, and this puts great pressure on managers to im-
prove." 93 This "great pressure" springs from two factors. First, the
market for capital is itself an incentive for directors to act with
care.9 4 Second, the market for capital affects the product and corpo-
rate control markets: 95
The higher the price of capital, the higher the firm's cost in mak-
ing and supplying goods. The higher its cost, the less it can sell in
competition with other firms that adopt superior management-
control devices. It also makes less per sale. Lower profits mean
diminished ability to divert benefits (and increased chance of
replacement) .96
A "diminished ability to divert benefits" means a limitation on di-
rectors' compensation-a product market effect. An "increased
chance of replacement" means a loss of relative job security.-a cor-
porate control market effect.
To be sure, not even those who urge shareholders to rely exclu-
sively on these market mechanisms contend that they are costless or
flawless. 97 They contend only that the costs of these mechanisms
are lower than those of the common-law regime. 98 This conten-
tion's truth hinges upon both empirical measurements99 and value
judgments of the market and common-law regime's relative ideolog-
ical costs. 00
93 Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 556.
94 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
96 Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 556.
97 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 542:
A warning. None of the competitive devices is costless or perfect. In-
deed, all are quite costly, and all together leave room for occasional fraud
and managerial slack. We live in an imperfect world. There is bound to
be some divergence between investors' interests and managers' actions.
The ALI's proposals [to strengthen fiduciary duties] rest on the view that
if markets have costs and imperfections, then we need legal rules to over-
come them. This is a non-sequitur. The observation that there are costs
requires us to ask further questions. How large is the divergence? Can it
be reduced by new legal rules without incurring costs that exceed the
benefits?
See also Baysinger & Butler, supra note 78, at 179 ("markets do not operate costlessly").
98 Many contend, specifically, that these market mechanisms will generate the "op-
timum" amount of shareholder protection: shareholders will sometimes be harmed by
careless directors, but the amount of that harm will be less than it would have cost to
prevent that harm. See, e.g., Baysinger & Butler, supra note 78, at 180 (managers do not
want "too much" autonomy and shareholders do not want "too much" control); The
TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.).
99 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
100 See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 156-65 and ac-
companying text.
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COSTS OF THE COMMON-LAW REGIME
The common-law regime imposes two types of costs: practical
and ideological. The common law's vagueness causes the practical
costs of inefficiency and loss of directorial talent; its officiousness
causes the ideological cost of loss of shareholders' freedom of con-
tract. By allowing shareholders to exculpate directors, the Delaware
statute restores shareholder freedom of contract, and thereby per-
mits them to cure the inefficiency and talent costs as well.
A. Difficulty in Planning and Behavioral Inefficiency
The common-law regime's unpredictability impedes directors'
abilities to plan their corporations' actions. The vagueness of duty-
of-care rules' 0 ' and the case-by-case nature of duty-of-care adjudica-
tion 0 2 make it difficult for a director to feel secure in his deci-
sions;103 he cannot ever be sure that he has exercised adequate care
unless the shareholders sue him and elicit a verdict. 10 4 The com-
mon-law system "actually encourages a substitution of the court's
judgment for that of the defendant director."' 05
Directors' wariness of being second-guessed by courts forces
101 See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
103 What Confucius said concerning "incorrect" language captures the vague nature
of duty-of-care doctrine and its damaging effect on business planning:
If language is incorrect, then what is said does not concord with what was
meant; and if what is said does not concord with what was meant, what is
to be done cannot be effected. If what is to be done cannot be effected,
then rites and music will not flourish. If rites and music do not flourish,
then mutilations and lesser punishments will go astray. And if mutila-
tions and lesser punishments go astray, then the people have nowhere to
put hand or foot.
CoNFucius, THE ANALECTS bk. XIII, at 171-72 (A. Waley trans. 1938); see also Veasey &
Manning, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
104 The time and expense of such a suit is, of course, itself also a cost of the com-
mon-law system.
105 Veasey & Manning, supra note 43, at 931.
This observation suggests a latent inconsistency between the common-law system
and the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule insulates the merits of
directors' decisions from judicial second-guessing if the business decision involves a
breach neither of the fiduciary duty of loyalty nor of the fiduciary duty of care. Arsht,
supra note 24, at 111. The primary reason for the rule is the courts' lack of competence
to adjudicate a decision's merits. Id- But if the court cannot competently evaluate the
product of a decision, how can it evaluate the process used to reach this decision? Leo
Herzel and Leo Katz call this an "odd dichotomy" and "a very elusive distinction."
Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business ofJudging BusinessJudgment, 41 Bus.
LAW. 1187, 1190 (1986). Perhaps the jurisprudential rationales for the business judg-
ment rule, when logically extended, call for courts to cease making duty-of-care judg-
ments altogether. The Delaware-style exculpation statutes would thus not go far
enough; a self-implementing statute such as Oklahoma's, see supra note 65, would be
more defensible.
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them to take inherently inefficient precautions. The precautions
take two forms: (1) avoiding business risks and (2) building "paper
shelters,"10 6 or "following more costly and time-consuming deci-
sionmaking procedures."10 7
1. Avoiding Business Risks
Directors who are subject to the fiduciary duty of care will avoid
more innovation and risk than shareholders would like.' 08 Given
the nature of equity stock, 10 9 all shareholders would presumably en-
courage, to some degree, 110 "aggressive managers who are willing
106 Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DUKE LJ.
895, 903.
107 Scott, supra note 2, at 936.
Professor Scott states with restraint that "[i]t is most doubtful whether [either of the
two kinds of precaution] would be in the best interest of shareholders." Id. The Busi-
ness Roundtable also recognizes both precautions, without Professor Scott's restraint:
The last thing American business needs as it competes with its foreign
counterparts is to be led by liability-shy directors whose major concern is
to avoid risk, create "paper trails" and generally "cover" themselves.
STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED
"PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS" 53 (1983).
108 This divergence of interests is particularly pronounced where diversified inves-
tors are concerned. Even directors who are not subject to the fiduciary duty of care will
avoid more risk than diversified shareholders would like.
Since corporate management has a larger stake in the survival [and free-
dom from derivative lawsuit] of a particular corporation than does a di-
versified shareholder-indeed, since management's viewpoint is closer to
that of the undiversified shareholder, its self-interest may cause it to be
too cautious so far as shareholders generally are concerned.
Winter, supra note 5, at 527; see also Edited Transcript, supra note 76, at 363 (remarks of
Professor Manne) ("general risk averseness of managers"); id at 364 (remarks of Profes-
sor Macey) ("managers can't really diversify").
109 Equity securities offer holders an unlimited profit potential in exchange for an
unsecured risk that their investment will become worthless. L. SOLOMON, supra note 74,
at 150-52. Debt securities, by contrast, offer holders only limited profit potential, in
exchange for relative security of investment. Id. at 154-56.
110 The degree of risk that shareholders want directors to take varies not only ac-
cording to each shareholder's risk preference, see infra note 134, but also according to
the degree to which each shareholder is diversified.
Undiversified shareholders, being concerned with the net performance of each of
their investments, will want directors to take only that amount of risk which is optimum
for the corporation, i.e., the amount of risk at which favorable outcomes within the cor-
poration will most substantially outweigh losses to the corporation from unfavorable
outcomes:
Many business decisions are made on the basis of suggestive but incon-
clusive information. Rational shareholders would not have it otherwise,
however, for their welfare is maximized by decisions that yield the highest
profits net of the costs of gathering information and making the
decisions.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 1196.
Diversified shareholders, by contrast, are concerned not with the individual per-
formance of each investment but rather with the range of "all possible future values of
their investment [portfolio]." Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARV. L. REV.
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to take good-faith risks in the search for profits.""'1 But the desire
to avoid personal liability under the fiduciary duty of care will cause
directors to avoid some such risks,112 and err on side of undue cau-
tion' 3 at the sacrifice of potential profits. As Professors Baysinger
and Butler explain in a more general context:
The benefits of enhanced legal controls ... are offset by sig-
nificant organizational costs. . . . At some point, increases in
[shareholder constraints on management] will reduce sharehold-
ers' wealth by stifling innovation .... Under stricter corporate
laws, the decreased risk of adverse managerial behavior is
'purchased' with the currency of increased likelihood of... mana-
gerial inertia.1 14
Under this type of inert management, shareholders profit less
than they would have had their directors taken the optimum amount
of risk. Thus, as Professor Manne observes, "You do good by pun-
ishing people for their mistakes, but you also do harm by preventing
603, 617 (1970). From a diversified investor's point of view, "[e]ven a security which is
quite risky taken alone may decrease total portfolio risk and, accordingly, be a more
prudent purchase than a security which appears less risky by itself." Id. at 617-18. Di-
versified investors will therefore want certain corporate directors to take more than the
optimum level of risk. See Winter, supra note 83, at 527; Fischel & Bradley, supra note 24,
at 266.
The common-law regime may thus be relatively well-tailored to undiversified share-
holders' desires, but this is no reason to retain it. "Given mutual funds and similar
forms of diversified investment, the law need not give special protection to shareholders
who refuse to reduce the volatility of risk by not diversifying." Winter, supra note 5, at
527.
111 Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33
Bus. LAw. 1993, 1993-94 (1978).
112 See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 24, at 265-66:
Because most lawsuits follow poor outcomes, courts naturally tend to as-
sume that such outcomes are a product of bad actions. This bias ... can
greatly discourage any risk taking by managers.... By definition ....
risky projects can have poor outcomes; if managers are sued whenever
decisions that were optimal ex ante turn out poorly ex post, they will tend
to avoid risky projects.
See also West, An Economist Looks at the ALI Proposals, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 638, 643 ("[W]hat
is most disturbing about the proposed principles [which include heightening of the duty
of care] is that they could lead some companies to take less risk, and be less innova-
tive."); Winter, supra note 5, at 526 (American Law Institute's proposed strengthening of
the common-law duty of care "may create incentives for overcautious corporate deci-
sions").
Judge Posner observes the same principle at work in the criminal law: "[S]ince
criminal sanctions are severe, to attach them to accidental conduct (and afortiori to un-
avoidable conduct) is to create incentives to steer clear of what may be a very broad zone
of perfectly lawful activity in order to avoid the risk of criminal punishment." R. Pos-
NER, supra note 11, § 7.5, at 221.
113 This caution is itself a cost to shareholders, distinct from the profits it causes
directors to forgo. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
114 Baysinger & Butler, supra note 78, at 181-82.
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them from taking any risk."' 5
2. Building Paper Shelters
Professor Conard brands this second form of precaution "dili-
gence in creating an appearance of diligence in whatever decisions
are made." 1 6 The precaution consists of directors' reluctance or
refusal to make decisions unless supplied with exhaustive, expert
opinions: accountants' certifications of the accuracy of financial
statements, investment bankers' opinions as to the valuation of op-
erations, engineers' analyses of production costs, lawyers' opinion
letters, et cetera. 117
Such behavior is clearly inefficient insofar as it causes unpro-
ductive expenditure of the corporation's time and money. Less ob-
vious than this unproductivity, but at least as undesirable, is the risk
of outright counterproductivity: the shelter-building tendency
"would force managers to find and use consultants who tend more
toward optimism than toward candor and illumination. In this way,
the fear of liability may tend to degrade, rather than to elevate, the
decisional processes 6f directors." 1 8
The tendency of directors under the common-law regime to
take shelter-building precautions can only be heightened by the Del-
aware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom. 119 That de-
cision held directors of the Trans Union Company liable for gross
negligence in approving a merger, partly because of the spareness
of their decisionmaking procedure. 120 The court failed to recognize
that "experienced and sophisticated" directors could "recognize
and approve a good deal at the drop of a hat"'12' while safely dis-
pensing with certain ordinary precautions. Other directors will in-
115 Edited Transcript, supra note 76, at 363.
116 Conard, supra note 106, at 904.
117 Id. at 90P-04; see also Herzel & Katz, supra note 105, at 1191:
Such formalism has a lot of costs. Most obviously, it will mean more reli-
ance on and more fees for lawyers, investment bankers, accountants,
management consultants, and economists, and who knows, maybe soci-
ologists, statisticians, psychologists, demographers, and population ge-
neticists. . . .After all, every decision has untold consequences and
ramifications.
See also West, supra note 112, at 642-43 (ALI's proposed heightening of duty of care
would cause directors to "feel under even more pressure than now to protect their hind
quarters," and would prompt "make work exercises whose only objective is to ward off
second guessing and Monday morning quarterbacking.").
118 Conard, supra note 106, at 904.
119 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
120 The board approved the merger without the benefit of an investment banker's
advice, after a meeting that lasted only two hours, and an oral presentation of the
merger's merits that lasted only twenty minutes. Id. at 868-69. However, beneath these
duty-of-care concerns lurk duty-of-loyalty concerns. See supra note 24.
121 Herzel & Katz, supra note 105, at 1189; see also Spiegel, The Liability of Corporate
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tensify their own shelter-building precautions after seeing these
business leaders punished for choosing not artificially to pad their
decisionmaking process. 122
B. Loss of Directorial Talent
The second practical cost of the common-law regime is its ten-
dency to deter would-be directors from serving. Wary of incurring
personal liability, current directors may either adopt relatively inac-
tive roles 123 or resign altogether; prospective directors may decline
proffered positions.
This deterrent effect is three-fold. First, even the best inten-
tioned director will have difficulty acting within the confines of the
common-law duty-of-care rules, because of those rules' unclarity. 124
He thus risks incurring liability due to an innocent misstep.' 25 Sec-
ond, even the director who succeeds in avoiding such missteps risks
being held liable because of the courts' erratic verdicts.' 26 "If a law
is unclear, . . . [there is] a risk that legitimate conduct will be found
to violate it." 127 And third, directors' liability insurance has become
unavailable or prohibitively priced.' 28 When available, this insur-
ance mitigates the two previous deterrent factors.' 29 One explana-
Officers, 71 A.B.A.J., Nov. 1985, at 48, 52 (.'The court did not give proper credence to
the experience level of the board.' ") (quoting Professor Donald Schwartz).
122 [One] effect of Smith v. Van Gorkom will be greater formalism on the
part of the board, as it goes about the business of cultivating an aura of
care, diligence, thoroughness, and circumspection. (As one director put
it: "Prudence and diligence are no longer assumed but require a certain
amount of posturing.").
Herzel & Katz, supra note 105, at 1191 (quoting R. MAuTrz & F. NEUMANN, CORPORATE
AUIIT COMMITTEES: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 87 (1977)). The spate of articles pub-
lished after the decision offers support for this forecast. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 45;
Spiegel, supra note 121.
123 See Conard, supra note 106, at 904 ("diligence in avoiding participation in crucial
decisions").
124 See supra notes 24-45 and accompanying text.
125 Negligence liability depends upon conduct, not upon intent or other state of
mind. W. KEETON, supra note 30, § 31, at 169 ("An honest blunder, or a mistaken belief
that no damage will result, may absolve the actor from moral blame" but not from legal
liability.). This also applies to one kind of gross negligence. See supra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
127 R. POSNER, supra note 11, § 20.3, at 513; see also Fischel & Bradley, supra note 24,
at 265 ("substantial error costs" of courts' duty-of-care decisions).
128 Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at D1, col. 3; Wall St. J.,
July 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
Because the fiduciary duty of care can subject even the most careful director to
adverse adjudication, see supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text, a director's rational
response to the unavailiability of insurance will be to resign rather than intensify his
care.
129 Uoyd's policy form insures directors against liability for any "wrongful act." J.
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tion given' 30 for the current unavailability of directors' liability
insurance is the growth of precisely those lawsuits that shareholder
action under the new statute can eliminate.' 3 1
Unfortunately, the common-law regime deters the careful as
much as it deters the negligent. Indeed, it may deter the careful
even more strongly than it does the negligent; as Professor Conard
points out, "[t]he quality of 'prudence,' so valued in a money man-
ager, is highly incompatible with incurring risks of million-dollar
[personal] liabilities."' 13 2
C. Infringement of Shareholders' Freedom of Contract
The third and arguably most significant cost of the common-law
regime is ideological rather than practical. It lies in the fact that the
fiduciary duty of care foists itself upon shareholders without regard
to whether any given shareholder desires it.133 Some shareholders,
at least, do not desire it. 134 Forcing them to accept it not only forces
app.-76 (1982 & Supp. 1986). This term is defined as including "any actual or alleged
breach of duty, neglect or error." Id. at app.-78.
Delaware law permits corporations to purchase directors' liability insurance against
all risks, including negligence. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1983).
130 Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at DI, col. 3.
131 In a shareholder action against directors of Wickes, Inc., one insurer paid out
$25 million. Wall St. J., July 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
Observers predict that widespread shareholder action under the statute will amelio-
rate the insurance supply crisis by reducing directors' need to insure themselves against
duty of care suits:
Some companies . . .have lost outside directors because they couldn't
find or afford liability insurance for them. That will probably happen less
often in 1987 than in recent years, predicts John M. Nash, president of
the National Association of Corporate Directors in Washington, D.C.
This, he notes, is largely because Delaware... [has] modified [its] laws to
make it possible for companies to indemnify directors against certain
claims.
Firms May Find Insuring Boards is Getting Easier, Wall St.J.,Jan. 13, 1987, at 31, col. 3; see
also Delaware Liability Law Warmly Received, Predictions on Impact Remain Cautious,
18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1309 (Sept. 12, 1986). It is interesting to observe Mr.
Nash's tacit assumption that many corporations' shareholders will choose to take action
under the new statute. As a basis for that assumption he must either believe that share-
holders are irrational, or that they will rely on the market protection mechanisms out-
lined supra notes 70-96 and accompanying text.
132 Conard, supra note 106, at 903; see also West, supra note 112, at 642 ("[I]t's not
surprising that more than a few people of the calibre we would like to have on major corporate
boards look at [the ALI's proposed strengthening of the duty of care] and say, 'who needs
it?' ") (emphasis added).
133 The fiduciary duty of care "arise[s] by operation of law and not by mere agree-
ment of the parties." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (5th ed. 1979); see Scott, supra note
24, at 300 ("ploy" of abolishing management's fiduciary duties by express contract "al-
most certainly would not be successful").
134 One can infer this from the shareholder action mentioned supra note 10 and ac-
companying text. Some would argue that such action does not necessarily reflect share-
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upon them the practical costs identified above,' 3 5 but also denies
them their freedom contractually to exculpate directors.' 36
That freedom of contract is a value, and hence that its infringe-
ment is a "cost,"' 37 is so widely accepted (albeit rarely articulated)
that it may seem platitudinous;138 the right to decide what one
wants, and on what terms, is very simply a component of autonomy
and hence of liberty.' 3 9 This is not the place to rehearse the broad
holder preference. See infra notes 168-88 and accompanying text for an analysis of this
argument.
The varying degrees of shareholders' desire for fiduciary protection may stem from
any of the following:
(a) Varying degrees of risk preference. ("A person is risk averse if he would pay
less than $5 for a 50% chance of receiving $10; risk neutral if he would pay exactly $5;
and risk preferring if he would pay more than $5." Fischel, supra note 9, at 918 n.30.).
(b) Varying degrees of willingness to rely on the market mechanisms for share-
holder protection examined supra notes 70-96 and accompanying text.
(c) Varying costs of contracting for alternative means of protection. See, e.g., Eas-
terbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698, 702 (1982) ("The
existence of such 'off-the-rack' [fiduciary rules] reduces the costs of transacting and of
enforcing restrictions on the agent's powers.").
135 Supra notes 101-32 and accompanying text.
136 "Fiduciary principles ... leave small room for the notions of 'consent' or 'agree-
ment' that govern the law of contract, even though the fiduciary arrangement generally
originates in a consensual transaction." Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and
the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1407 n.15 (1985).
137 See supra note 11.
138 "As Whitehead noted, fundamental assumptions 'appear so obvious that people
do not know what they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever
occurred to them."' Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 247, 247-48 (1978).
139 Hayek writes:
It is one of the fundamental rights and duties of a free man to decide
what and whose needs appear to him most important.... The recogni-
tion that each person has his own level of values which we ought to re-
spect, even if we do not approve of it, is part of the conception of the
value of the individual personality.
F. HAYEK, supra note 77, at 79; see also C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 20 (1981)
("[H]olding people to their obligations is a way of taking them seriously.... [R]espect
for others as free and rational requires taking seriously their capacity to determine their
own values."); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 8 (1962) ("[Flreedom in eco-
nomic arrangements is itself a component of freedom broadly understood, so economic
freedom is an end in itself."); R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 58 (1974) ("My
nonpaternalistic position holds that someone may choose ... to do to himself anything,
unless he has acquired an obligation to some third party not to do or allow it.") (empha-
sis in original); cf. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1896):
The "liberty" mentioned in [the 14th] amendment means, not only the
right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his per-
son, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of
the citizen ... to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential
to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned.
The fact that such Lochner-era reasoning has fallen into disfavor as constitutional doc-
trine does not impair its validity as an ideological position.
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and rich debate between proponents of this value and proponents of
the contrary value of sacrificing freedom of contract in order to pro-
mote sharing and commonality of interest among individuals. 140
One may simply observe that each set of values is defensible and has
some place in the social order. As applied to the subject at hand,
the Delaware statute promotes autonomy over commonality,
whereas the common-law regime promotes the contrary.' 4 '
Whichever of the two values one holds more important, the
"worth" of neither autonomy nor commonality in a given context is
quantifiable. Such values "do not lend themselves to collective mea-
surement which is acceptably objective and nonarbitrary."142 One's
inability to quantify them, though, does not obviate these costs' im-
portance to one's evaluation of the new statutes' merits. "[U]nless
140 See, e.g., Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 563
(1982) ("paternalism" based on "empathy or love"); Atiyah, Book Review, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 509, 527 (1981). Professor Atiyah wrote,
The proposition that a person is always the best judge of his own inter-
ests is a good starting point for laws and institutional arrangements, but
as an infallible empirical proposition it is an outrage to human experi-
ence. The parallel moral argument, that to prevent a person, even in his
own interests, from binding himself is to show disrespect for his moral
autonomy, can ring very hollow when used to defend a grossly unfair
contract secured at the expense of a person of little bargaining skill.
Id. Professor Atiyah's comments are particularly pertinent to the notion, addressed infra
notes 149-67 and accompanying text, that shareholder agreements to exculpate direc-
tors result from a disparity of bargaining power.
141 A simple model illustrates this. Suppose that A and B are shareholders of differ-
ent corporations. Suppose further that the director of A's corporation is negligent, and
the director of B's corporation is not. That is, A has invested foolishly and B has in-
vested wisely. If both corporations' shareholders have adopted exculpation provisions,
then A cannot recover damages for his director's negligence, and is seriously injured. B,
on the other hand, is not only unaffected by A's loss; he also benefits from his director's
increased efficiency. See supra notes 101-32 and accompanying text. Thus, the new stat-
utes favor those who look out for themselves.
Under the common-law regime, by contrast, both corporations' directors operate
under the threat of lawsuit. Investor A will sue to recover damages for his director's
negligence; B will not sue. A thus recovers his loss, but B now is injured, because the
director of his corporation has become too cautious. See supra notes 10 1-32 and accom-
panying text. Thus, under the common-law regime, B is forced to "share" A's loss,
bearing some smaller costs so that A will not have to bear a larger cost alone.
142 Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111 (1972). "Where is the price that reveals what
people are willing to pay to avoid exposing children to pornography? How can the
monetary value of corrective justice be measured? On what pseudo or implicit market is
the societal distaste for voluntary slavery demonstrated?" Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency,
8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 646 (1980); see also A. POLINSKY, supra note 11, at 123-24 (pro-
cess of valuing nonstandardized goods is difficult). Professor Polinsky writes, "For ex-
ample, suppose as a result of pollution someone is forced to move from his home.
Although the market price of the home could be determined from the sales prices of
similar homes, this price will not reflect the special attachment the person who lived
there may have had for that location and that house." Id
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we claim that whatever cannot be (easily) quantified does not exist,
they are indeed crucial."' 43
As a rule, in the domain of private arrangements, our legal sys-
tem has favored not only freedom of contract over paternalism in
general, but also the right in particular of individuals to exculpate
others from negligence:
It is quite possible for the parties expressly to agree in ad-
vance that the defendant is under no obligation of care for the
benefit of the plaintiff, and shall not be liable for the conse-
quences of conduct which would otherwise be negligent. There is
in the ordinary case no public policy which prevents the parties
from contracting as they see fit, as to whether the plaintiff will
undertake the responsibility of looking out for himself.144
Moreover, this general rule has been held to encompass
agent/principal relationships, 145 which of course are analogous to
shareholder/director relationships.1 46
In arguing that shareholders should be allowed to choose for
themselves whether to seek the fiduciary duty of care's protection,
one presupposes that shareholders can, in fact, freely make such a
choice. Two arguments are sometimes made that they cannot;
neither, as is shown below, is persuasive. The first argument claims
that shareholders suffer from a "disparity of bargaining power" vis-
a-vis directors, and that a charter amendment adopted under the
new statutes should therefore be held void as a matter of contract
law. 147 The second argument broadly asserts that shareholders'
voting power in general is inadequate, in theory or practice, to pro-
tect shareholders' interests. 148
1. Absence of Disparity in Bargaining Power
It is true that some jurisdictions hold exculpatory clauses void
"where there is such disparity of bargaining power between the par-
ties that the agreement does not represent a free choice on the part
of the plaintiff."1 49 But this rule is not an exception to the freedom
143 Rizzo, supra note 142, at 646.
144 W. KEETON, supra note 30, § 68, at 482 (footnote omitted); Id. at 482 nn.16-17;
see also Annotation, Validity of Exculpatory Clause in Lease Exempting Lessor from Liability, 49
A.L.R.3d 321 (1986).
145 Griffiths v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18 (1947).
146 See, e.g., L. SOLOMON, supra note 74, at 27 (directors "act as representatives of the
shareholders").
147 See infra notes 149-67 and accompanying text.
148 See infra notes 168-88 and accompanying text.
149 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B comment j (1965); see also Tunkl v.
Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 101, 383 P.2d 441,446, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, at
38 (exculpatory clause void where "the releasing party does not really acquiesce volun-
tarily in the contractual shifting of the risk").
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of contract principle; to the contrary, it is that principle's logical co-
rollary. A contract that is the product of such a disparity is not
"free" at all, and so should not be enforced.1 50 However, no such
disparity exists between shareholders and directors.
In those jurisdictions that recognize disparity in bargaining
power as a reason to void exculpatory clauses, its essential attribute
appears to be an absence of feasible alternatives for the weaker
party.151 Three criteria used to void exculpatory clauses concern
that absence: "practical necessity," "decisive advantage of bargain-
ing strength," and "adhesion contract."' 152 Applying each of these
criteria will illustrate just how inapposite the line of argument is.
The first criterion is that "[t]he party seeking exculpation [be]
engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public,
which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of
the public."' 153 The urgently sick do need medical care; 154 families
in a tight housing market do need shelter; 55 but a prospective in-
150 See Kennedy, supra note 140, at 577 ("To claim that freedom of contract doesn't
take into account unequal bargaining power. . . is just wrong. Allowance for these
situations is part of the very definition of the institution."); cf. F. HAYEK, supra note 77, at
77 ("The complementarity of liberty and responsibility means that the argument for
liberty can only apply to those who can be held responsible. It cannot apply to infants,
idiots, or the insane.").
151 This attribute would account for virtually all of the contexts in which exculpatory
clauses have been held void: lessee exculpating lessor in tight housing market, Kay v.
Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (D.C. App. 1946); patient exculpating hospital, Tunkl v. Regents of
the Univ. of Calif., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); employee
exculpating employer, Illinois Cen. R.R. v. Harris, 108 Miss. 574, 67 So. 54 (1914);
users exculpating public utility, Collins v. Virginia Power & Elec. Co., 204 N.C. 320, 168
S.E. 500 (1933). See also REsTA-EMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496B illustration 5 (1977)
(driver exculpating operator of only available parking lot).
The cases voiding exculpatory clauses on other grounds are either unpersuasively
reasoned, e.g., John's Pass Seafood Co. v. Weber, 369 So. 2d 616, 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (lessor "simply should not be permitted" to exempt himself from statutory
duty), or arise from extenuating circumstances. E.g., Taylor v. Leedy & Co., 412 So. 2d
763 (Ala. 1982) (willful failure to disclose latent defect); Wise v. Dawson, 353 A.2d 207
(Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (tortious misrepresentation).
152 Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr.
33 (1963); Henrioulle v. Main Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 573 P.2d 465, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1978). The quoted criteria are drawn from California cases merely because,
as the most detailed and articulate on the subject, they provide the clearest and strong-
est challenge to this Note's argument.
The Delaware law on this subject (aside from the statute at issue) consists only of a
narrow statute that voids exculpatory clauses in road construction contracts, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2704(a) (1974 & Supp. 1986), and Wise v. Dawson, 352 A.2d 207 (Del.
Super. 1975). That case contains dictum that harmonizes with our statute, 353 A.2d at
208 (exculpatory clause "would possibly be effective in a contract action"), and finds the
defendant liable only because of the extenuating circumstance of his tortious
misrepresentation.
153 Tunkl, 60 Cal. 2d at 98-99, 383 P.2d at 445, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
154 Id. at 92, 383 P.2d at 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
155 E.g., Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (D.C. App. 1946).
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vestor need not invest at all. Even less does he need to invest in any
particular corporation's stock. 156 A prospective investor has endless
alternatives-including buying stock in a corporation that has not
exculpated its directors.
The second criterion is that "the party invoking exculpation
possess[] a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any
member of the public who seeks his services." 157 Because the pro-
spective investor has many alternatives, the firm has no bargaining
advantage. Indeed, if either side does have such an advantage, it is
the prospective investor: the market for capital 158 will prompt firms
to attempt to supply the contract terms he wishes.
The third criterion is that the party seeking exculpation "con-
front[] the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpa-
tion, and make[] no provision whereby a purchaser may pay
additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negli-
gence."'159 By contrast, the charter provision permitted by the stat-
ute will not be "standardized," on either an intra- or inter-
corporation level. On the intra-corporation level, each corporation
will have only one carefully considered exculpation provision. On
an inter-corporation level, the wording and the extent160 of various
corporations' exculpation provisions will differ. Moreover, in fur-
ther contrast to the third criterion, shareholders may indeed "pay
additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negli-
gence"' 161 simply by rejecting or repealing the charter provision,
thereby reviving the common-law rules. 162 The "additional fees"
would be "paid" in the form of the practical costs of the common-
law regime.'16
Moreover, three unique attributes of corporation law
strengthen shareholders' bargaining position and further distin-
guish the shareholder/director context from those where courts
156 A prospective investor has endless alternatives-including buying stock in a cor-
poration that has not exculpated its directors.
157 Tunkl, 60 Cal. 2d at 99-100, 383 P.2d at 446, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
158 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
159 Tunkl, 60 Cal. 2d at 100-01, 383 P.2d at 446, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 38 (footnote omit-
ted); cf. McCutcheon v. United Homes Co., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 450 n.5, 486 P.2d 1093,
1097 n.5 (1971) (reserving decision on validity of an exculpatory clause in lease if sup-
ported by consideration of reduced rent).
160 The statute permits shareholder to either eliminate directors' liability or merely
limit it. See supra text accompanying note 64.
161 Tunkl, 60 Cal. 2d at 100-01, 383 P.2d at 446, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
162 Concerning the adequacy of shareholders' voting power, see infra notes 168-88
and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 101-22 and accompanying text. Compare Professors Baysinger
and Butler's metaphor of "the increased risk of managerial behavior being
'purchased,'" supra text accompanying note 114.
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have invalidated exculpatory clauses. 164 First, shareholders have
only limited potential losses: while a landlord's or doctor's negli-
gence can cause boundless physical and monetary damages, a direc-
tor's negligence can only cause monetary losses limited to the
"victim's" investment. 165 Second, the market mechanisms for
shareholder protection 166 resulting from the free transferability of
shares, and the enormous market for them, generate surrogate pro-
tection against carelessness. Finally, unlike the uninformed tenant
or patient, the investor is armed with exhaustive, SEC-mandated
disclosures,167 making him less likely to be taken advantage of in the
bargaining process.
2. Adequacy of Shareholder Voting Power
Observers agree that shareholders do not exercise their proxy
voting rights 168 as actively as they might. 169 They offer, however,
conflicting explanations of this phenomenon. Some attribute the
relative absence of shareholder participation to shareholders' per-
ception that their vote is futile because the proxy system is weighted
in favor of management. As Berle and Means put it, "The proxy
machinery has thus become one of the principal instruments not by
which a stockholder exercises power over the management of the
enterprise, but by which his power is separated from him." 170 If this
explanation were correct, then the freedom of contract argument
for the new statutes 171 would lose its force, because shareholder ap-
proval of the newly permitted charter provision could not be consid-
ered a product of genuine shareholder choice. But a stronger
argument, outlined below, indicates that the Berle and Means expla-
nation is unfounded. The relative absence of shareholder participa-
164 For cases invalidating exculpatory clauses, see supra note 151.
165 E.g., W. KLEIN &J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 135 (1986).
166 See supra notes 77-100 and accompanying text.
167 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1
to -102 (1987).
168 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1983). ("[E]ach stockholder shall be entitled to 1
vote for each share of capital stock held by such stockholder .... Each stockholder
entitled to vote at a meeting of stockholders ... may authorize another person or per-
sons to act for him by proxy .... ).
169 E.g., SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96Tm CONG., 2d
SEss., S.E.C. STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 67 (Comm. Print 1980)
[hereinafter SEC REPORT] ("absence of shareholder participation"; "shareholder apa-
thy"); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 395, 420 (1983)
("[m]anagers still are rarely displaced by voters; managers' recommendations on funda-
mental corporate changes, amendments of by-laws, or other matters are routinely fol-
lowed; shareholders' proposals do well if they have 5 percent of the vote").
170 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 129
(rev. ed. 1968); see also SEC REPORT, supra note 169, at 67.
171 See supra notes 133-44.
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tion actually reflects rational shareholder choice, rather than some
ill-defined shortcoming of the proxy system.
In disputing the Berle and Means position, 172 Professors Eas-
terbrook and Fischel state sweepingly that "there is no reason why
shareholders ... should have any interest.., in managing the firm's
affairs."' 173 This statement applies when management is acting in
the shareholders' interest, because delegation to management is an
efficient division of labor. 174 But the statement also applies when
management is not acting in the shareholders' interest (as, oppo-
nents of the new statute would argue, when management pushes
through a resolution adopting the newly permitted charter provi-
sion). The reason is that proxy voting is not the shareholder's only
effective means of self-protection. As an alternative to voting,
shareholders can either sell their shares or retain ownership and suf-
fer whatever injury may result.1 75
The rational shareholder's choice among these three options
depends on the relative costs and benefits of each. 176 The voting
option may have high costs and low benefits; "Since time is a scarce
resource, voting is inherently costly."1 77 Shareholder voting con-
sumes time and effort in reading and understanding the proxy solic-
itation materials, 178 evaluating their merits, and marking and
returning the ballot.' 79 Moreover, the benefits resulting from this
172 Easterbrook and Fischel do not specifically address Berle and Means; rather,
their attack focuses on a proponent of a more meaningful opportunity to participate in
the proxy process.
173 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 169, at 420.
174 Delegation of authority enables skilled managers to run enterprises even
though they lack personal wealth, and it enables wealthy people to invest
even though they lack managerial skills. It reduces the risks that investors
must incur, because it enables them to spread investments among many
enterprises. Delegation also helps managers to pool enough capital to
take advantage of available economies of scale in production, to reduce
the costs of bargaining and contracting, and to obtain the benefits of pro-
ductive information that must be used in secret or not at all.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 134, at 700 (footnote omitted); see also A. BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 1, at 4 (rev. ed. 1946); 1 A. SMrrH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 1-16 (E. Cannan ed. 1976) (exchange, even without
planning, allows improvement in productive power); authorities cited in Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 83, at 1170 n.26.
175 See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970) for a discussion, in a
broader context, of the relative merits of each of the three options.
176 See generally A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-76 (1957) (dis-
cussing conditions under which abstention is a rational choice).
177 Id at 265; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 169, at 402 ("Because voting
is expensive, the participants in the venture will arrange to conserve on its use.").
178 This is no small task, given the complexity of most such solicitations. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-3, -101 (1987) (specifying informational requirements of proxy
solicitation).
179 Cf. A. DowNs, supra note 176, at 265 (Political voting is not costless because
"every act takes time. In fact, time is the principal cost of voting: time to register, to
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voting effort may not be large: the gains to be had from a favorable
election outcome must be discounted by the unlikelihood of ob-
taining that outcome. 180 Easterbrook and Fischel write:
Each shareholder will recognize that his votes will not affect the
outcome of any dispute unless he has a large bloc of shares. As a
result, each shareholder's self-interest leads him to ignore the
controversy; it is costly to become informed, and the cost pro-
duces little prospect of benefit. If each shareholder reasons in the
same way, as he should, the managers of the firm will prevail in
any contest about their operation of the company. And that is the
pattern in the market.' 8 '
Given the small net incentives to vote, the shareholder's other
two alternatives become more rational. Retaining ownership with-
out voting is rational when the shareholder/decisionmaker antici-
pates only a small injury to the corporation from an adverse election
outcome.' 8 2 For example, even a shareholder who opposes excul-
pation can rationally retain his ownership and refrain from voting
against the charter amendment, if the market mechanisms 83 protect
him sufficiently.
The second alternative to voting, i.e., selling one's shares, is
rational even when the shareholder/decisionmaker anticipates the
injury to the corporation from an adverse election outcome to be
large. For if the outcome that he considers adverse is at all likely to
occur, then many other shareholders must consider that outcome
favorable.' 84 Under these circumstances, our decisionmaker can
sell his shares to these other shareholders without discounting his
price. "Any inclination toward disagreements among shareholders
about how the company should be managed tends to be halted auto-
matically, as one side will simply buy out the other."' 85 The ease
discover what parties are running, to deliberate, to go to the polls, and to mark the
ballot.").
180 This unlikelihood inheres in the fact that the measure being voted upon will fail
unless a majority (or in some instances more) of the shares are voted in its favor. E.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (requiring approval of "a majority of the outstanding
stock entitled to vote thereon" for charter amendment to succeed).
One could reduce this unlikelihood by campaigning, but that would increase the
costs of the voting option.
181 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 1171 (discussing the free-rider prob-
lem's inhibiting effect on shareholder voting).
182 A. DowNs, supra note 176, at 265 ("minuscule" return from voting effort does
not render voting worthwhile); see also Manne, Some Theoretical Aspect of Share Voting, 64
COLuM. L. REV. 1427, 1429 (1964) ("[i]ndeed, the cost of informing themselves dictates
the not irrational conclusion for many voters that abstention is their best policy").
183 Supra notes 77-100 and accompanying text.
184 Only if many shareholders consider the prospective outcome favorable will they
intend to vote for it. And only if they intend to vote for it will it be likely to come about.
185 Manne, supra note 182, at 1445.
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and ready availability of this "exit option through the stock mar-
ket"18 6 makes selling "the rational strategy for dissatisfied share-
holders in most cases .... 1187
To protect their interests, then, shareholders need not (and in-
deed where costs are high enough should not) actively participate in
the proxy process. Those who assume that the relative absence of
shareholder participation reflects an inadequacy of shareholder vot-
ing power ignore the "far more plausible explanation"' 8 8 that
shareholders use the alternative courses of action outlined here. Far
from stifling shareholder freedom of choice, then, the proxy process
simply allows shareholders the freedom to choose not to choose.
IV
ARE THE STATUTES DESIRABLE?
To decide whether the statutes are desirable is to decide how
the costs they engender compare to the costs of the common-law
regime. A rigorously empirical analysis would be unable to reach
such a decision for two reasons. First, the practical costs of each
system remain unquantified. Second, and more important, the ideo-
logical costs of each system defy quantification because by their na-
ture they vary among individuals.
Anyone whose interest in the matter exceeds the merely scien-
tific, however, must make such a decision upon less than complete
data, as have the state legislatures. This writer, for one, has decided
in the statute's favor. The costs of the common-law regime must
exceed the costs engendered by the statutes, if only because the lat-
ter are so low. After all, the statutes permit exculpation for director
misconduct of only a sharply limited kind;' 8 9 directors' own self-in-
terest will keep any resulting carelessness to a minimum; 190 some of
the remaining lack of care will benefit the shareholder, not harm
him; 19' and the shareholder has ample opportunity to dissociate
himself, beforehand, should the situation portend a greater lack of
care than he desires. 192
It is true that sorne shareholders will fail so to dissociate them-
selves, and that as a result they will be injured, but the question is to
what lengths society should go in order to prevent that injury. 193
186 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 169, at 420.
1-87 Id.
188 Id.
189 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 70-96 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 101-32 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 133-88 and accompanying text.
193 Compare Professor Easterbrook's observation that not every cost should neces-
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On this question the ideological issue1 94 is crucial. No one disputes
that to help one's neighbor is a virtue-but to force others to help
one's neighbor, as does the common-law regime, 195 is surely a
mixed virtue at best. This forced altruism is even less defensible
where the neighbor's injury results only from his own inattention or
misjudgment, 96 and where the costs of helping him to cure his mis-
take are significant.' 97 If the ideology of commonality does not
yield to autonomy under these circumstances, one wonders where it
ever will.
This Note has demonstrated the crucial roles of both empirical
and ideological considerations in evaluating the statutes' merits.
Whatever one's position on the ideological issue, one should take
account of the facts set forth here. The common law of the fiduciary
duty of care is a knot of vague doctrine; 198 it causes directors to
avoid an undue amount of risk,199 it causes them to build unneces-
sary paper shelters200 and deters others from serving at all, 20 1 and it
imposes itself officiously upon its purported beneficiaries. 20 2 These
costs represent the price of the duty of care's protection. The new
statutes permit shareholders to decide for themselves whether they
wish to pay that price, and thereby surely constitute an improve-
ment over the common-law system.
Carl Samuel Bjerre
sarily be remedied; one should first inquire whether the remedy would be worse than the
cost. Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 542 (quoted supra note 97).
194 See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
195 See illustrative model supra note 141.
196 See supra notes 149-88 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 23-58 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 101-15 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 133-88 and accompanying text.
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